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William L. Harper
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1992, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1992), pp. 353-364
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192849
Page Count: 12
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Game theory, Nash equilibrium, Information feedback, Rationality, Decision theory, Causal decision theory, Expected utility, Ratifiability, Chaos theory, Recommendations
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Skyrms' investigations of dynamic deliberation are traced through his book of 1990 and his subsequent investigation of dynamic deliberation based on inductive rules to his recent results about chaos generated by evolutionary game dynamics. It is argued that the dynamics studied in the book, and the inductive dynamics as well, need to be supplemented to yield the correct recommendation in an example game. Some features about information feedback are pointed out. Finally, it is suggested that more work is needed to assess whether Skyrms' results about chaos have any interesting implications for plausible game theoretic representations of interactions among human agents.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association © 1992 The University of Chicago Press