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Paraconsistent Logic: The View from the Right
Peter K. Schotch
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1992, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1992), pp. 421-429
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192854
Page Count: 9
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"The best known approaches to "reasoning with inconsistent data" require a logical framework which is decidedly non-classical. An alternative is presented here, beginning with some motivation which has been surprised in the work of C.I. Lewis, which does not require ripping great swatches from the fabric of classical logic. In effect, the position taken in this essay is representative of an approach in which one assumes the correctness of classical methods excepting only the cases in which the premise set is (classically) inconsistent.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association © 1992 The University of Chicago Press