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Albert Einstein Meets David Lewis
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1988, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1988), pp. 65-81
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192872
Page Count: 17
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Determinism, Spacetime, Geometric shapes, Mathematical objects, Substantivalism, Modal realism, General relativity, Regional identity, Argumentation, Isomorphism
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I reject Norton and Earman's hole argument that spacetime substantivalism is incompatible with determinism. I reconcile these both technically and philosophically. There is a technical definition of determinism that is not violated by pairs of models of the kind used in the hole argument. And technicalities aside, the basic idea of determinism is not violated if we claim that at most one of the two models represents a possible world. This claim can be justified either by metrical essentialism (advocated by Maudlin), or by denying transworld identity for points: I prefer the latter.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association © 1988 The University of Chicago Press