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Formal Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science

Kevin T. Kelly
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1988, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1988), pp. 413-423
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192902
Page Count: 11
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Formal Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science
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Abstract

Formal learning theory is an approach to the study of inductive inference that has been developed by computer scientists. In this paper, I discuss the relevance of formal learning theory to such standard topics in the philosophy of science as underdetermination, realism, scientific progress, methodology, bounded rationality, the problem of induction, the logic of discovery, the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of psychology.

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