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Philosophy of Psychology Meets the Semantic View

Valerie Gray Hardcastle
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1994, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1994), pp. 24-34
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192914
Page Count: 11
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Philosophy of Psychology Meets the Semantic View
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Abstract

Many philosophers of psychology fail to appreciate the constructivist process of science as well as its pragmatic aspects. A well-developed philosophy of science helps to clear many conceptual confusions. However, ridding ourselves of popular complaints only opens more sophisticated worries regarding how we generalize specific events and how we use those generalizations to build physical systems and abstract models. These questions can still be answered though by realizing that science is largely a social enterprise, and how and what we explain depends a great deal upon who is asking the question of whom and when.

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