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Shifting Frames: From Divided to Distributed Psychologies of Scientific Agents
Peter J. Taylor
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1994, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1994), pp. 304-310
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192940
Page Count: 7
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Scientific belief, Psychology, Cognitive psychology, Social psychology, Philosophical psychology, Depressive disorders, Genetic variation, Social interaction, Motivation, Reality
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I characterize and then complicate Solomon, Thagard and Goldman's framing of the issue of integrating cognitive and social factors in explaining science. I sketch a radically different framing which distributes the mind beyond the brain, embodies it, and has that mind-body-person become, as s/he always is, an agent acting in a society. I also find problems in Solomon's construal of multivariate statistics, Thagard's analogies for multivariate analysis, and Goldman's faith in the capacity of the community of users of scientific method to home in on true beliefs.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association © 1994 The University of Chicago Press