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Neo-Skinnerian Psychology: A Non-Radical Behaviorism
Terry L. Smith
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1988, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1988), pp. 143-148
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192979
Page Count: 6
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Functional analysis, Cognitive psychology, Psychological reinforcement, Psychology, Behaviorism, Explanation theories, Human behavior, Mentalism, Analytics, Mathematical dependent variables
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Neo-Skinnerianism differs from Radical Behaviorism in at least three important respects: (1) its willingness to entertain cognitive accounts of the processes underlying behavioral dispositions, (b) its reluctance to assert that the results of animal experiments can be used to predict and control human behavior, and (c) its ability to side step folk psychology's major criticism of operant theory. While eschewing Radical Behaviorism's ambition to transform psychology (and, indeed, human society itself), it nonetheless joins issue with a centuries-old debate over human nature, and may eventually help to resolve it.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association © 1988 The University of Chicago Press