Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

On the Logic of Interrogative Inquiry

Jaakko Hintikka and Stephen Harris
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1988, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1988), pp. 233-240
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192990
Page Count: 8
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($14.00)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
On the Logic of Interrogative Inquiry
Preview not available

Abstract

In Jaakko Hintikka's interrogative model of inquiry, the strategic principles governing empirical inquiry (interrogatively construed) turn out to be closely related to those governing deductive reasoning. Hence it is important to study the precise analogies which obtain between deductive logic and interrogative inquiry. The basic concept of the interrogative model is the relation of model consequence $\text{M}\colon \text{T}\vdash \text{C}$. It is said to obtain iff C can be derived from T by means of an interrogative process in the model M (in the logicians' sense of model). We prove here a counterpart of Craig's interpolation theorem for the concept of model consequence. The interrogative analogue to definability is a logical generalization of methodologists' concept of identifiability. For this concept, we prove an analogue to Beth's theorem. Some further philosophical consequences of these results are mentioned. For instance, identifiability is a good rational reconstruction of the idea of observability (measurability).

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[233]
    [233]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
234
    234
  • Thumbnail: Page 
235
    235
  • Thumbnail: Page 
236
    236
  • Thumbnail: Page 
237
    237
  • Thumbnail: Page 
238
    238
  • Thumbnail: Page 
239
    239
  • Thumbnail: Page 
240
    240