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Arguing for the Natural Ontological Attitude
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1988, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1988), pp. 294-301
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192996
Page Count: 8
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Philosophical realism, Truth, Judgment, Antirealism, Scientific belief, Pragmatism, Empirical adequacy, Pragmatic justifications, Epistemology, Empiricism
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Arthur Fine has recently argued that standard realist and anti-realist interpretations of science should be replaced by "natural ontological attitude" (NOA). I ask whether Fine's own justification for NOA can meet the standards of argument that underlie his criticisms of realism and anti-realism. Fine vacillates between two different ways of advocating NOA. The more minimalist defense ("why not try NOA?") begs the question against both realists and antirealists. A stronger program, based on Fine's arguments for a "no-theory" of truth, has promise, but the arguments must be developed in a stronger, more general form if they are to justify NOA.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association © 1988 The University of Chicago Press