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Could Theoretical Entities Save Realism?

Mohamed Elsamahi
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1994, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1994), pp. 173-180
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/193022
Page Count: 8
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Could Theoretical Entities Save Realism?
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Abstract

Hacking and other entity realists suggest a strategy to build scientific realism on a stronger foundation than inference to the best explanation. They argue that if beliefs in the existence of theoretical entities are derived from experimentation rather than theories, they can escape the antirealist's criticism and provide a stronger ground for realism. In this paper, an outline and a critique of entity realism are presented. It will be argued that entity realism cannot stand as a separate position from classical realism. Thus, entity realism cannot avoid the problems facing classical realism..

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