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Implications of the Cognitive Sciences for the Philosophy of Science
Ronald N. Giere
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1990, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1990), pp. 419-430
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/193085
Page Count: 12
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Does recent work in the cognitive sciences have any implications for theories or methods employed within the philosophy of science itself? It does if one takes a naturalistic approach in which understanding the nature of representations or judgments of representational success in science requires reference to the cognitive capacities or activities of individual scientists. Here I comment on recent contributions from three areas of the cognitive sciences represented respectively by Paul Churchland's neurocomputational perspective, Nancy Nersessian's cognitive-historical approach, and Paul Thagard's computational philosophy of science. The main general conclusion is that we need to replace traditional linguistic notions of representation in science.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association © 1990 The University of Chicago Press