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How the Laws of Physics Don't Even Fib
A. David Kline and Carl A. Matheson
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1986, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1986), pp. 33-41
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/193105
Page Count: 9
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The most recent challenge to the covering-law model of explanation (N. Cartwright, How the laws of Physics Lie) charges that the fundamental explanatory laws are not true. In fact explanation and truth are alleged to pull in different directions. We hold that this gets its force from confusing issues about the truth of the laws in the explanation and the precision with which those laws can yield an exact description of the event to be explained. In defending this we look at Cartwright's major case studies and sketch an amended covering-law model of explanation.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association © 1986 The University of Chicago Press