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Niels Bohr, Complementarity, and Realism

Henry J. Folse
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1986, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1986), pp. 96-104
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/193111
Page Count: 9
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Niels Bohr, Complementarity, and Realism
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Abstract

Although it is, often considered a form of anti-realism, here it is argued that Bohr's complementarity viewpoint must accept entity realism based on its analysis of the causal interaction involved in observation. However, because Bohr accepts the quantum postulate he must reject the view that the goal of theory is to represent the independently existing object apart from observation. Thus he abandons the spectator account of knowledge and with it the correspondence theory of truth. In this respect his view is parallel to the positions held by Hacking, Cartwright, and Ellis.

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