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Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style
Arthur Denzau, William Riker and Kenneth Shepsle
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 79, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), pp. 1117-1134
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1956251
Page Count: 18
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Voting, Legislators, Congressional voting, Voting behavior, Political science, Voting paradox, Economic theory, Incumbents, Strategic behavior, Nash equilibrium
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This article is aimed at integrating two kinds of analysis of legislators' calculations of advantage. We assume that legislators operate in two arenas, in the legislative arena itself, where their calculations of advantage concern simply their effectiveness in voting (Farquharson), and in the electoral arena, where their calculations concern the rewards for their position-taking as well as their effectiveness (Fenno). Our analysis is introduced by an interpretation of voting on the Powell amendment, 1956, when some legislators apparently voted strategically and others, equally able to do so, still did not. We then develop an expected utility model of voting that accounts for such divergent choices in terms of legislators' individual beliefs about the distribution of opinions in the legislature (Farquharson) and in their constituencies (Fenno). We conclude with an analysis of the Nash equilibria of choices to vote strategically or nonstrategically.
The American Political Science Review © 1985 American Political Science Association