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Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions
Robert H. Salisbury
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 78, No. 1 (Mar., 1984), pp. 64-76
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1961249
Page Count: 13
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Interest group theory traditionally assumed that policies advocated by group representatives in some sense grow out of the interests or values of the group's members. Mancur Olson and others compelled important revisions in this assumption, but still left the process of interest advocacy to membership groups. It is contended here that institutions, such as corporations or local governments, occupy a dominant position with respect to interest representation in Washington, and this finding requires substantial revisions in both theoretical and descriptive formulations of the governmental process.
The American Political Science Review © 1984 American Political Science Association