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The Political Economy of State Medicaid Policy
Charles J. Barrilleaux and Mark E. Miller
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 82, No. 4 (Dec., 1988), pp. 1089-1107
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1961751
Page Count: 19
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Medicaid, Supply, Government spending, Supply and demand, Physicians, Demand, Health care economics, Health care industry, Environmental policy
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We develop and test a market-based model to explain variations in states' welfare medicine policy decisions. The empirical results support the model of state policy outputs, indicating that states' spending efforts for welfare medicine are most sensitive to the supply of services within their borders. We learn in addition that spending effort declines with demand for services, indicating that the states spending the highest proportions of total personal income for the program are those who need it most and can afford it least. Measures of political system development affect spending effort positively and significantly, suggesting that ideology, diversity of interests, and administrative professionalism increase states' welfare efforts.
The American Political Science Review © 1988 American Political Science Association