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Review: Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity

Reviewed Works: The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order by Jon Elster; Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality by Jon Elster; Political Choice and Social Structure: An Analysis of Actors, Interests, and Rationality by Barry Hindess; The Common Good: Citizenship, Morality, and Self-Interest by Bill Jordan; Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics by James G. March, Johan P. Olsen; Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics by George Tsebelis
Review by: Elinor Ostrom
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 85, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 237-243
DOI: 10.2307/1962889
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1962889
Page Count: 7
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