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Candidate Equilibrium and the Behavioral Model of the Vote

Robert S. Erikson and David W. Romero
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 84, No. 4 (Dec., 1990), pp. 1103-1126
DOI: 10.2307/1963255
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1963255
Page Count: 24
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Candidate Equilibrium and the Behavioral Model of the Vote
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Abstract

Most applications of spatial modeling to the problem of electoral competition are pessimistic regarding the prospects for candidate equilibrium in more than one policy dimension. Probabilistic models of the vote, however, increase the likelihood of equilibrium. We expand the probabilistic model to include measured non-issue variables, thereby representing the general multivariate model of behavioral research. For this model we offer a general candidate equilibrium solution and illustrate with some simulations based on 1988 National Election Study data. The more complicated one's model of voters' motivations, the greater appears to be the chance of locating a candidate equilibrium position in policy space.

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