You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Choosing Justice in Experimental Democracies with Production
Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 84, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 461-477
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1963529
Page Count: 17
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Distributive justice, Productivity, Taxpaying, Taxation, Taxes, Political science, Justice, Commercial production, Democracy, Net income
Were these topics helpful?See somethings inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
We examine in a laboratory setting how direct participation in choosing a principle of distributive justice and a tax system impinges on subjects' attitudes and subsequent productivity when they participate in a task, produce income, and then experience losses or gains according to the tax system. Experience with a redistributive principle and its associated taxation system in a production environment does not detract from overall acceptance of the distributive principle, particularly for subjects who participate in choosing the principle. Participation in discussion, choice, and production increases subjects' convictions regarding their preferences. For these subjects (especially recipients of transfers) productivity rises significantly over the course of the experiments. No such effect is evident for subjects who do not participate in setting the regime under which they are to labor. The results' implications for questions of democratic participation and the stability of income support programs are drawn.
The American Political Science Review © 1990 American Political Science Association