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Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas
William T. Bianco and Robert H. Bates
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 84, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 133-147
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1963633
Page Count: 15
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Games, Credible threats, Political science, Residual claimant theory of wages, Retaliation, Collective action, Dominant strategy, Cooperation, Government bureaucracy, Economic theory
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We return to the analysis of cooperation among interdependent rational individuals. We emphasize the limited impact of iteration (or repeated play) and explore the possibility of an alternative: intervention by rational agents, whom we call leaders. We show that leadership is more significant for initiating cooperation than for sustaining it. In addition, we identify two features of organizations that are critical in determining a leader's ability to initiate and sustain cooperation by structuring the incentives of his followers: the leader's capabilities (information and strategy sets) and reward structure (payoff function).
The American Political Science Review © 1990 American Political Science Association