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The Free Will Theodicy
Vol. 34, No. 4 (Dec., 1998), pp. 457-470
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008188
Page Count: 14
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The Free Will Theodicy (FWT) attempts to defeat the Argument from Evil by claiming that the suffering of the innocent (SOI) is justified by the existence of free will (FW). I argue against the FWT by demonstrating that there are at least three logically possible worlds, one without FW and two with it, such that, if given a choice, all conscious beings would act rationally in choosing to live in any of those three worlds rather than in the current world. This choice outcome undermines the FWT's contention that FW adequately justifies the quantity and severity of the SOI in this world.
Religious Studies © 1998 Cambridge University Press