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On 'A New Cosmological Argument'
Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 2000), pp. 345-353
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008300
Page Count: 9
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Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss contend that their 'new cosmological argument' is an improvement over familiar cosmological arguments because it relies upon a weaker version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason than that used in those more familiar arguments. However, I note that their 'weaker' version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason entails the 'stronger' version of that principle which is used in more familiar arguments, so that the alleged advantage of their proof turns out to be illusory. Moreover, I contend that, even if their argument did rely on a weaker version of the Principle of Sufficient reason, nontheists would still be perfectly within their rights to refuse to accept the conclusion of the argument.
Religious Studies © 2000 Cambridge University Press