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Ideal Worlds and the Transworld Untrustworthy
Michael J. Almeida
Vol. 40, No. 1 (Mar., 2004), pp. 113-123
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008513
Page Count: 11
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Instantiation, Modal realism, Evil, Ontological essence, Moral agency, Cubes, Inference, Contrafactuals, Free will, Morality
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The celebrated free-will defence was designed to show that the ideal-world thesis presents no challenge to theism. The ideal-world thesis states that, in any world in which God exists, He can actualize a world containing moral good and no moral evil. I consider an intriguing two-stage argument that Michael Bergmann advances for the free-will defence, and show that the argument provides atheologians with no reason to abandon the ideal-world thesis. I show next that the existence of worlds in which every essence is transworld untrustworthy provides atheologians with no better reason to abandon the ideal-world thesis. I conclude that neither the free-will defence nor Bergmann's revised free-will defence is a convincing response to the atheological challenge.
Religious Studies © 2004 Cambridge University Press