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Good, God, and the Open-Question Argument
Vol. 41, No. 3 (Sep., 2005), pp. 335-341
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008602
Page Count: 7
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In "Finite and Infinite Goods," Robert Adams defends his metaphysical account that good is resemblance to God via an 'open-question' intuition. It is, however, unclear what this intuition amounts to. I give two possible readings: one based on the semantic framework Adams employs, and another based on Adams's account of humankind's epistemological limitations. I argue that neither of these readings achieves Adams's advertised aim.
Religious Studies © 2005 Cambridge University Press