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Emotion and the Concept of Behavior: A Disproof of Philosophical Behaviorism

Moreland Perkins
American Philosophical Quarterly
Vol. 3, No. 4 (Oct., 1966), pp. 291-298
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009215
Page Count: 8
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Emotion and the Concept of Behavior: A Disproof of Philosophical Behaviorism
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