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Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Semantic View of Theories

John Bickle
Erkenntnis (1975-)
Vol. 39, No. 3 (Nov., 1993), pp. 359-382
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20012516
Page Count: 24
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Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Semantic View of Theories
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Abstract

Recently some philosophers have urged that connectionist artificial intelligence is (potentially) eliminative for the propositional attitudes of folk psychology. At the same time, however, these philosophers have also insisted that since philosophy of science has failed to provide criteria distinguishing ontologically retentive from eliminative theory changes, the resulting eliminativism is not "principled". Application of some resources developed within the semantic view of scientific theories, particularly recent formal work on the theory reduction relation, reveals these philosophers to be wrong in this second contention, yet by and large correct in the first.

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