You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
Expected Utility and Constrained Maximization: Problems of Compatibility
Vol. 41, No. 1 (Jul., 1994), pp. 37-48
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20012562
Page Count: 12
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Expected utility, Utility maximization, Prisoners dilemma, Economic utility, Rational choice theory, Lotteries, Rationality, Reason, Morality, Social contract
Were these topics helpful?See something inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Preview not available
In recent attempts at deriving morality from rationality expected utility theory has played a major role. In the most prominent such attempt, Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, a mode of maximizing utility called constrained maximization is defended. I want to show that constrained maximization or any similar proposal cannot be coherently supported by expected utility theory. First, I point to an important implication of that theory. Second, I discuss the question of what the place of constrained maximization in utility theory might be. Third, I argue that no matter how we answer this question, expected utility theory cannot provide the reason why a moral disposition like constrained maximization is to be preferred to its rivals.
Erkenntnis (1975-) © 1994 Springer