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Unknown Probabilities: In Memory of Annemarie Anrod Shimony (1928-1995)
Vol. 45, No. 2/3, Probability, Dynamics and Causality (Nov., 1996), pp. 327-335
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20012733
Page Count: 9
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From a point of view like de Finetti's, what is the judgmental reality underlying the objectivistic claim that a physical magnitude X determines the objective probability that a hypothesis H is true? When you have definite conditional judgmental probabilities for H given the various unknown values of X, a plausible answer is sufficiency, i.e., invariance of those conditional probabilities as your probability distribution over the values of X varies. A different answer, in terms of conditional exchangeability, is offered for use when such definite conditional probabilities are absent.
Erkenntnis (1975-) © 1996 Springer