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Extensions as Representative Objects in Frege's Logic

M. Ruffino
Erkenntnis (1975-)
Vol. 52, No. 2 (2000), pp. 239-252
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20012985
Page Count: 14
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Extensions as Representative Objects in Frege's Logic
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Abstract

Matthias Schirn has argued on a number of occasions against the interpretation of Frege's "objects of a quite special kind" (i.e., the objects referred to by names like 'the concept F') as extensions of concepts. According to Schirn, not only are these objects not extensions, but also the idea that 'the concept F' refers to objects leads to some conclusions that are counter-intuitive and incompatible with Frege's thought. In this paper, I challenge Schirn's conclusion: I want to try and argue that the assumption that 'the concept F' refers to the extension of F is entirely consistent with Frege's broader views on logic and language. I shall examine each of Schirn's main arguments and show that they do not support his claim.

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