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A Paraconsistent Theory of Belief Revision

Edwin D. Mares
Erkenntnis (1975-)
Vol. 56, No. 2 (2002), pp. 229-246
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20013117
Page Count: 18
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A Paraconsistent Theory of Belief Revision
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Abstract

This paper presents a theory of belief revision that allows people to come to believe in contradictions. The AGM theory of belief revision takes revision, in part, to be consistency maintenance. The present theory replaces consistency with a weaker property called "coherence". In addition to her belief set, we take a set of statements that she rejects. These two sets are coherent if they do not overlap. On this theory, belief revision maintains coherence.

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