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The Preface Paradox Revisited

Igor Douven and Jos Uffink
Erkenntnis (1975-)
Vol. 59, No. 3 (Nov., 2003), pp. 389-420
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20013235
Page Count: 32
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The Preface Paradox Revisited
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Abstract

The Preface Paradox has led many philosophers to believe that, if it is assumed that high probability is necessary for rational acceptability, the principle according to which rational acceptability is closed under conjunction (CP) must be abandoned. In this paper we argue that the paradox is far less damaging to CP than is generally believed. We describe how, given certain plausible assumptions, in a large class of cases in which CP seems to lead to contradiction, it does not do so after all. A restricted version of CP can thus be maintained.

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