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Goldman on Knowledge as True Belief

Pierre Le Morvan
Erkenntnis (1975-)
Vol. 62, No. 2 (2005), pp. 145-155
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20013320
Page Count: 11
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Goldman on Knowledge as True Belief
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Abstract

Alvin Goldman contends that, in addition to the familiar sense or use of the term "knowledge" according to which knowledge is at least true justified belief, there is a weaker yet strict sense or use of the term "knowledge" according to which knowledge amounts to nothing more than information-possession or mere true belief. In this paper, I argue that Goldman has failed to show that there is such a weaker sense, and that, even if he had shown this, he has not shown that this putative weaker sense is a strict one by his own criterion for strictness.

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