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Putnam and Constructibility

Luca Bellotti and Luca Belloti
Erkenntnis (1975-)
Vol. 62, No. 3 (2005), pp. 395-409
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20013337
Page Count: 15
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Putnam and Constructibility
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Abstract

I discuss and try to evaluate the argument about constructible sets made by Putnam in "Models and Reality", and some of the counterarguments directed against it in the literature. I shall conclude that Putnam's argument, while correct in substance, nevertheless has no direct bearing on the philosophical question of unintended models of set theory.

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