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How Subjectivity Is Truth in the "Concluding Unscientific Postscript"
Edward J. Hughes
Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 197-208
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20019735
Page Count: 12
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The present article returns to Søren Kierkegaard's "Concluding Unscientific Postscript" in order to delineate the complex relations that obtain between his concepts of subjectivity, inwardness and passion. Supporting concepts, such as appropriation, existence, and interest, are also referred to as aids in tracing these relationships. I argue that the entire gestalt of terms in the "Concluding Unscientific Postscript" is coherent, consistently used, and that Kierkegaard, despite the poetic format of his style, has constructed a rigorous philosophical anthropology that is neither objectivist, nor subjectivist in its ultimate statement. This is the basis for the name of the article, 'How Subjectivity is Truth in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript'. Subjectivity can be truth in Kierkegaard's work because his use of the term transcends the normal denotation of both subjectivity and objectivity in religious philosophical discourse and refers to a state of existence with a unique ontological status.
Religious Studies © 1995 Cambridge University Press