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Explanatory Rationalism and Contingent Truths
Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 237-242
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20019738
Page Count: 6
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Sufficient reason, Truth, Logical truth, Modal realism, Abstract objects, Rationalism, Reason, Astronomical objects, Contradictories, Truth value
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This paper extends the orthodox bounds of explanatory rationalism by showing there can be an explanation of why there are positive contingent truths. A positive contingent truth is a true proposition that entails that at least one contingent concrete object exists. It is widely thought that it is impossible to explain why there are positive contingent truths. For example, it is thought by Rowe that 'God created the universe' is a positive contingent truth and therefore cannot explain why there are positive contingent truths. I show, however, that the reasoning behind this orthodox view is unsound and that it is possible to explain why there are positive contingent truths.
Religious Studies © 1995 Cambridge University Press