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Explanatory Rationalism and Contingent Truths

Quentin Smith
Religious Studies
Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 237-242
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20019738
Page Count: 6
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Explanatory Rationalism and Contingent Truths
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Abstract

This paper extends the orthodox bounds of explanatory rationalism by showing there can be an explanation of why there are positive contingent truths. A positive contingent truth is a true proposition that entails that at least one contingent concrete object exists. It is widely thought that it is impossible to explain why there are positive contingent truths. For example, it is thought by Rowe that 'God created the universe' is a positive contingent truth and therefore cannot explain why there are positive contingent truths. I show, however, that the reasoning behind this orthodox view is unsound and that it is possible to explain why there are positive contingent truths.

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