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The Problem of Evil and a Plausible Defence
Frank J. Murphy
Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 243-250
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20019739
Page Count: 8
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This paper argues that God may create and exist in any possible world, no matter how much suffering of any sort that world includes. It combines the traditional free will defence with the notion of an 'occasion' for good or evil action and limits God's responsibility to the creation of these occasions. Since no possible world contains occasions for more evil than good action, God is morally permitted to create any possible world. With regard to suffering that is not due to free will, namely the suffering of beings who are not moral agents, the paper questions the idea that the relief of such suffering is a moral perfection.
Religious Studies © 1995 Cambridge University Press