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Depravity, Divine Responsibility and Moral Evil: A Critique of a New Free Will Defence

A. M. Weisberger
Religious Studies
Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1995), pp. 375-390
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20019758
Page Count: 16
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Depravity, Divine Responsibility and Moral Evil: A Critique of a New Free Will Defence
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Abstract

A new free will defence, one which does not insist upon a necessary connection between free will and wrongdoing, has been proposed by Professor Clem Dore. I show that this attempt to clear God of blame, however, suffers from a few problems. First, in analysing the concept of free will, I argue for an interpretation which focuses upon epistemic rather than ontologic constraints. Second, I maintain that the moral relations between God and the created order should be viewed as context dependent. Other criticisms also contribute to the conclusion that this free will defence is not viable.

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