Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Incentives for Risk Selection and Omitted Variables in the Risk Adjustment Formula

Erik Schokkaert and Carine Van De Voorde
Annales d'Économie et de Statistique
No. 83/84, Health, Insurance, Equity (Jul. - Dec., 2006), pp. 327-351
Published by: GENES on behalf of ADRES
DOI: 10.2307/20079173
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20079173
Page Count: 25
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Incentives for Risk Selection and Omitted Variables in the Risk Adjustment Formula
Preview not available

Abstract

Risk adjustment in health insurance raises the question of how to treat variables which influence health care expenditures but do not capture acceptable costs differences. We argue that these variables should be included in the explanatory model and neutralized afterwards for the computation of the premium subsidies. This explicit approach is better than the conventional approach in removing the incentives for cream-skimming. We illustrate the empirical relevancy of the problem with data for Belgium. /// L'ajustement du risque dans l'assurance des soins de santé soulève une question quant au traitement des variables ayant un impact sur les dépenses en soins de santé qui ne capturent pas de différences de coûts socialement acceptables. Nous soutenons que ces variables devraient quand même être incluses dans le modèle explicatif, mais ne pas être prises en compte lors du calcul des subsides de compensation. Cette approche est meilleure que l'approche standard pour neutraliser les incitations à la sélection des profils de risque. Une application empirique sur des données belges illustre notre propos.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[327]
    [327]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
328
    328
  • Thumbnail: Page 
329
    329
  • Thumbnail: Page 
330
    330
  • Thumbnail: Page 
331
    331
  • Thumbnail: Page 
332
    332
  • Thumbnail: Page 
333
    333
  • Thumbnail: Page 
334
    334
  • Thumbnail: Page 
335
    335
  • Thumbnail: Page 
336
    336
  • Thumbnail: Page 
337
    337
  • Thumbnail: Page 
338
    338
  • Thumbnail: Page 
339
    339
  • Thumbnail: Page 
340
    340
  • Thumbnail: Page 
341
    341
  • Thumbnail: Page 
342
    342
  • Thumbnail: Page 
343
    343
  • Thumbnail: Page 
344
    344
  • Thumbnail: Page 
345
    345
  • Thumbnail: Page 
346
    346
  • Thumbnail: Page 
347
    347
  • Thumbnail: Page 
348
    348
  • Thumbnail: Page 
349
    349
  • Thumbnail: Page 
350
    350
  • Thumbnail: Page 
351
    351