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Vladimir Solov'ëv's "Virtue Epistemology"

Edward M. Swiderski
Studies in East European Thought
Vol. 51, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), pp. 199-218
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20099705
Page Count: 20
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Vladimir Solov'ëv's "Virtue Epistemology"
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Abstract

I attempt to clarify the connection between two late texts by V. S. Solov'ëv: "Justification of the Good" and "Theoretical Philosophy." Solov'ëv drew attention to the intrinsic connection between moral and intellectual virtues. "Theoretical Philosophy" is the initial -- unfinished -- sketch of the dynamism of mind seeking truth as a good. I sketch several parallels and analogies between the doctrine of moral experience set out in Justification and the account of the intellect's dynamism based on immediate certitude set out in "Theoretical Philosophy." Solov'ëv can thus be considered as a 'virtue epistemologist' in the current meaning given to this description. I conclude by suggesting that Solov'ëv's position on these questions does not easily cohere with the 'impersonalism' he appears to defend in "Theoretical Philosophy".

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