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High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967-1977

Michael Barnett
World Politics
Vol. 42, No. 4 (Jul., 1990), pp. 529-562
DOI: 10.2307/2010513
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010513
Page Count: 34
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High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967-1977
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Abstract

The literature on international political economy explains foreign economic policies by integrating systemic, state, and societal features. Theoretical approaches to national security, however, have tended to extract the state from its societal context. An adequate conceptualization of security policy must integrate both systemic forces and the domestic political economy. One way of integrating these concerns is by examining the state's strategies for mobilizing those financial, productive, and human resources considered necessary for national security. This article examines the political economy of the state's mobilization of resources for national security, called "war preparation," and proposes a framework for investigation that consists of three elements: (1) the objectives of state managers, (2) the constraints on the state, and (3) the policies of the state for mobilizing its required resources. Based upon these considerations, some tendencies in the government's war preparation strategies are suggested. The utility of this framework is explored through an empirical examination of Israel between 1967 and 1977. The study demonstrates how Israel's war preparation strategies were shaped by the states's domestic and security objectives, the domestic political economy, and systemic constraints and opportunities.

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