Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Justification, Truth, and Coherence

Keith Lehrer and Stewart Cohen
Synthese
Vol. 55, No. 2, Justification and Empirical Knowledge, Parts III and IV (May, 1983), pp. 191-207
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20115868
Page Count: 17
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
Justification, Truth, and Coherence
Preview not available

Abstract

A central issue in epistemology concerns the connection between truth and justification. The burden of our paper is to explain this connection. Reliabilism, defended by Goldman, assumes that the connection is one of reliability. We argue that this assumption is too strong. We argue that foundational theories, such as those articulated by Pollock and Chisholm fail to elucidate the connection. We consider the potentiality of coherence theories to explain the truth connection by means of higher level convictions about probabilities, which we call doxastic ascent, and defend such a theory. Our defense appeals to the work of Reid and contemporary cognitive psychology in order to account for the psychological reality of higher level evaluations.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[191]
    [191]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
192
    192
  • Thumbnail: Page 
193
    193
  • Thumbnail: Page 
194
    194
  • Thumbnail: Page 
195
    195
  • Thumbnail: Page 
196
    196
  • Thumbnail: Page 
197
    197
  • Thumbnail: Page 
198
    198
  • Thumbnail: Page 
199
    199
  • Thumbnail: Page 
200
    200
  • Thumbnail: Page 
201
    201
  • Thumbnail: Page 
202
    202
  • Thumbnail: Page 
203
    203
  • Thumbnail: Page 
204
    204
  • Thumbnail: Page 
205
    205
  • Thumbnail: Page 
206
    206
  • Thumbnail: Page 
207
    207