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Some Problems Facing Intuitionist Meta-Methodologies
Vol. 67, No. 1, The Role of History in and for Philosophy (Apr., 1986), pp. 115-129
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20116260
Page Count: 15
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Intuition, Mathematical intuitionism, Rational intuitionism, Historical methodology, Philosophy of science, Reason, History of science, Normativity, Rational choice theory, Judgment
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Intuitionistic meta-methodologies, which abound in recent philosophy of science, take the criterion of success for theories of scientific rationality to be whether those theories adequately explicate our intuitive judgments of rationality in exemplary cases. Garber's (1985) critique of Laudan's (1977) intuitionistic meta-methodology, correct as far as it goes, does not go far enough. Indeed, Garber himself advocates a form of intuitionistic meta-methodology; he merely denies any special role for historical (as opposed to contemporary or imaginary) test cases. What all such positions lack is a base from which to inform, criticize, or restructure our core methodological intuitions. To acquiesce in this is to deny that exemplary cases can serve the sort of warranting role required for intuitionism. This point is reinforced by a series of reasons for denying the warranting role of pre-analytic judgments of rationality. These reasons point the way toward an improved approach to meta-methodology.
Synthese © 1986 Springer