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Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards

Stewart Cohen
Synthese
Vol. 73, No. 1, Social Epistemology (Oct., 1987), pp. 3-26
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20116441
Page Count: 24
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Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards
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Abstract

This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception. Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives reply to skepticism in order to defend this reply against the objection that it is ad hoc.

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