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Can There Be One-Way Causal Conditionship?

David H. Sanford
Synthese
Vol. 76, No. 3 (Sep., 1988), pp. 397-408
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20116570
Page Count: 12
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Can There Be One-Way Causal Conditionship?
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Abstract

I defend my attempt to explain causal priority by means of one-way causal conditionship by answering an argument by J. A. Cover about Charles' law. Then I attempt to say what makes a philosophical analysis a counterfactual analysis, so I can understand Cover's claim that my account is "at its base a counterfactual one". Finally I examine Cover's discussion of my contention that "necessary for in the circumstances" is nontransitive.

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