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Realisms

Michael Levin
Synthese
Vol. 85, No. 1 (Oct., 1990), pp. 115-138
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20116835
Page Count: 24
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Realisms
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Abstract

It is argued that the general thesis of realism is ill-defined, as are various versions of its denial. Only specific theses of the form 'There are K's' make clear sense. It is also argued that various efforts to deny realism always turn out to deny specific existential theses. Thus, it is argued, van Fraassen and Schwartz deny the existence of electrons.

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