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Is Hintikka's Logic First-Order?

Matti Eklund and Daniel Kolak
Synthese
Vol. 131, No. 3 (Jun., 2002), pp. 371-388
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20117258
Page Count: 18
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Is Hintikka's Logic First-Order?
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Abstract

Jaakko Hintikka has argued that ordinary first-order logic should be replaced by independence-friendly first-order logic, where essentially branching quantification can be represented. One recurring criticism of Hintikka has been that Hintikka's supposedly new logic is equivalent to a system of second-order logic, and hence is neither novel nor first-order. A standard reply to this criticism by Hintikka and his defenders has been to show that given game-theoretic semantics. Hintikka's branching quantifiers receive the exact same treatment as the regular first-order ones. We develop a different reply, based around considerations concerning the nature of logic. In particular, we argue that Hintikka's logic is the logic that best represents the language fragment standard first-order logic is meant to represent. Therefore it earns its keep, and is also properly regarded as first-order.

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