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Externalism and Identity
Vol. 134, No. 3 (Mar., 2003), pp. 463-475
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20117344
Page Count: 13
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The main aim of this paper is to show that there is one version of supervenience of the mental on the physical which is entailed by token-token identity (I call this version change-supervenience); and to establish that of the other better known versions of supervenience in the literature (which I call difference-supervenience), none are so entailed. One consequence of this is that Burge's thought experiments while successful in refuting difference-supervenience cannot in themselves refute identity thesis. However, the introduction of change supervenience leads me to devise an analogous thought experiment against change-supervenience, thus refuting identity thesis as well.
Synthese © 2003 Springer