If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

More on Putnam and Tarski

Panu Raatikainen
Synthese
Vol. 135, No. 1 (Apr., 2003), pp. 37-47
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20117353
Page Count: 11
  • Download PDF
  • Cite this Item

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
More on Putnam and Tarski
Preview not available

Abstract

Hilary Putnam's famous arguments criticizing Tarski's theory of truth are evaluated. It is argued that they do not succeed to undermine Tarski's approach. One of the arguments is based on the problematic idea of a false instance of T-schema. The other ignores various issues essential for Tarski's setting such as language-relativity of truth definition.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[37]
    [37]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
38
    38
  • Thumbnail: Page 
39
    39
  • Thumbnail: Page 
40
    40
  • Thumbnail: Page 
41
    41
  • Thumbnail: Page 
42
    42
  • Thumbnail: Page 
43
    43
  • Thumbnail: Page 
44
    44
  • Thumbnail: Page 
45
    45
  • Thumbnail: Page 
46
    46
  • Thumbnail: Page 
47
    47