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Objectivity and the Double Standard for Feminist Epistemologies

Elisabeth A. Lloyd
Synthese
Vol. 104, No. 3, Feminism and Science (Sep., 1995), pp. 351-381
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20117438
Page Count: 31
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Objectivity and the Double Standard for Feminist Epistemologies
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Abstract

The emphasis on the limitations of objectivity, in specific guises and networks, has been a continuing theme of contemporary analytic philosophy for the past few decades. The popular sport of baiting feminist philosophers -- into pointing to what's left out of objective knowledge, or into describing what methods, exactly, they would offer to replace the powerful "objective" methods grounding scientific knowledge -- embodies a blatant double standard which has the effect of constantly putting feminist epistemologists on the defensive, on the fringes, on the run. This strategy can only work if 'objectivity' is transparent, simple, stable, and clear in its meaning. It most certainly is not. In fact, taking 'objectivity' as a sort of beautiful primitive, self-evident in its value, and all-powerful in its revelatory power, requires careless philosophy, and the best workers in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science have made reworked definitions of 'objectivity' absolutely central to their own projects. In fact, classic feminist concerns with exploring the impact of sex and gender on knowledge, understanding, and other relations between human beings and the rest of the world fall squarely within the sort of human and social settings that are already considered central in most current analytic metaphysics, episteomology, and philosophy of science. I argue that the burden of proof is clearly on those who wish to reject the centrality and relevance of sex and gender to our most fundamental philosophical work on knowledge and reality.

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