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Reciprocal Justification in Science and Moral Theory

James Blachowicz
Synthese
Vol. 110, No. 3 (Mar., 1997), pp. 447-468
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20117608
Page Count: 22
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Reciprocal Justification in Science and Moral Theory
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Abstract

In this paper, I analyze the particular conception of reciprocal justification proposed by Nelson Goodman and incorporated by John Rawls into what he called "reflective equilibrium". I propose a way of avoiding the twin dangers which threaten to push this idea to either of two extremes: the reliance on epistemically privileged observation reports (or moral judgments in Rawls' version), which tends to disrupt the balance struck between the two sides of the equilibrium and to re-establish a foundationalism; and the denial of any privileged status to such reports (or judgments), which makes the equilibrium into a theoretical monolith.

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